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File PR-2025-013 The British Columbia Corps of Commissionaires v. Department of Public Works and Government Services |
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Determination issued |
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The RFP was published even though BCCC was unable to find it
PWGSC should consider investigating why BCCC was unable to find the RFP
There was no evidence of a predetermined outcome
IN THE MATTER OF a complaint filed by The British Columbia Corps of Commissionaires pursuant to subsection 30.11(1) of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act;
AND FURTHER TO a decision to conduct an inquiry into the complaint pursuant to subsection 30.13(1) of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act.
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BETWEEN |
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THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CORPS OF COMMISSIONAIRES |
Complainant |
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AND |
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THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND GOVERNMENT SERVICES |
Government Institution |
DETERMINATION
Pursuant to section 30.16 of the CITT Act, the Tribunal awards the Department of Public Works and Government Services costs in the amount of $287.50 payable by The British Columbia Corps of Commissionaires.
The Tribunal rescinds the postponement of award order it made on July 11, 2025, pursuant to subsection 30.13(3) of the CITT Act.
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Eric Wildhaber |
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Eric Wildhaber |
The statement of reasons will be issued at a later date.
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Tribunal Panel: |
Eric Wildhaber, Presiding Member |
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Complainant: |
The British Columbia Corps of Commissionaires |
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Counsel for the Complainant: |
Paul D. McLean |
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Government Institution: |
Department of Public Works and Government Services |
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Counsel for the Government Institution: |
Don Karl Roberto |
Please address all communications to:
The Registry
Telephone: 613-993-3595
Email: citt-tcce@tribunal.gc.ca
STATEMENT OF REASONS
BACKGROUND
[1] This matter pertains to a request for proposal (RFP) (solicitation M2989-252261) issued by the Department of Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC) on behalf of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RFP was published on April 28, 2025, with bids due by May 28, 2025.[1]
[2] On July 3, 2025, The British Columbia Corps of Commissionaires (BCCC) filed a complaint pertaining to this procurement process under subsection 30.11(1) of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act. This filing was further to BCCC having been denied a request that the solicitation bidding period be reopened to allow it to bid after it had failed to become aware of the RFP despite its continuous monitoring of such opportunities.
[3] The Tribunal initially believed that BCCC’s July 3, 2025, filing was incomplete and, accordingly, requested additional information from BCCC that same day. From BCCC’s response on July 8, 2025, the Tribunal determined that the requested information had already been included in BCCC’s initial filing. Accordingly, the Tribunal determined that the complaint had been properly filed as of July 3, 2025.
[4] The Tribunal accepted the complaint for inquiry on July 9, 2025.
[5] On July 11, 2025, pursuant to subsection 30.13(3) of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, the Tribunal issued an order postponing any award of contract until the Tribunal disposed of the complaint. Having completed the inquiry, the order has now been rescinded.
[6] On August 8, 2025, PWGSC filed a Government Institution Report (GIR).[2]
[7] On August 21, 2025, BCCC confirmed that it would not file any comments on the GIR.
[8] The RFP was for the procurement of “scene security and emergent event services”
in British Columbia, which fall under commodity code 92121504 (security guard services) of the United Nations Standard Products and Services Code (UNSPSC). The record shows that on April 28, 2025, PWGSC posted a notice regarding the RFP on the CanadaBuys website, which linked to the SAP Ariba platform where the solicitation documents were available throughout the bidding period.[3] Both postings indicated that PWGSC last amended the RFP on May 23, 2025, and that the bidding period ended on May 28, 2025. They referenced commodity code 92121504 and specified that the services would be delivered in British Columbia.[4]
[9] BCCC did not see this opportunity while it was active and cannot understand why it missed it despite having monitoring procedures in place. BCCC conducted an internal investigation but was unable to determine why the opportunity had been missed. The complaint summarizes the various aspects of BCCC’s monitoring system and the investigative steps it took.[5] Having been unable to identify any fault of its own, BCCC concluded that the RFP had not been published correctly.
ANALYSIS
The RFP was published even though BCCC was unable to find it
[10] The Tribunal recognizes that BCCC has extensive experience in bidding on and providing security services in British Columbia. The Tribunal also recognizes that BCCC has robust monitoring procedures in place. In the Tribunal’s view, human error, while not impossible, is unlikely, given that the RFP was active on CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba for a month and that BCCC carries out its monitoring procedures on a daily basis. Furthermore, the Tribunal is satisfied that BCCC took reasonable steps to investigate whether any of its internal procedures contributed to missing the solicitation during the bidding period, and that it genuinely found no error or omission on its part.
[11] Yet the Tribunal has before it evidence from PWGSC showing that the RFP was published and available on CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba throughout the bidding period, from April 28 to May 28, 2025, and that at least four proponents became aware of it and submitted a bid.[6]
[12] In the Tribunal’s view, this matter does not, strictly speaking, concern whether PWGSC published the RFP, but rather whether the search and notification functions of CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba functioned as expected for BCCC and, potentially, for other suppliers.
[13] This also means that, while the Tribunal understands BCCC’s position that it was unintentionally unable to become aware of the RFP in time to submit a bid using the search or notification functions of CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba, the record shows that PWGSC met its trade obligations. The evidence shows that PWGSC published the RFP in accordance with articles 506(1) and (6) of the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA).
PWGSC should consider investigating why BCCC was unable to find the RFP
[14] The Tribunal recognizes that this still leaves unanswered the following question: What value does the publication of a solicitation hold if the electronic platform on which it is posted cannot be reliably searched or its notification system fails to properly alert potential suppliers such as BCCC that should be identified as “matched lead”
for security service opportunities in British Columbia?[7] That is a valid question, but the Tribunal was not prepared to equate the CFTA’s publication obligation with an obligation to provide a reliable search and notification support mechanism, at least not in the context of this complaint.[8]
[15] This is partly because BCCC did not provide detailed evidence documenting its internal procedures when it filed the complaint, particularly the precise search parameters and UNSPSCs that it monitors. BCCC provided a summary description of those procedures or allegations regarding them, but did not provide evidence (e.g., procedure manuals, screenshots, affidavits) of their precise and specific nature. If, as alleged by BCCC, CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba are underperforming, PWGSC and the Tribunal require the most well-documented leads in order to investigate so that concrete action can be taken. Absent evidence of the sort at the time of filing the complaint, the Tribunal was unable to investigate the issue.[9] As well, in the GIR, PWGSC noted that it had identified or tagged the RFP using UNSPSC 92121504. BCCC did not file comments on the GIR, and, therefore, did not address whether it monitors that code.
[16] Nevertheless, the Tribunal is satisfied that BCCC searches CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba to the best of its abilities and current procedures using, at a minimum, the search term “British Columbia”
. The failure of that search parameter alone remains unanswered or suspect from a systemic standpoint. Moreover, the question arises as to why CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba did not notify BCCC given that it should obviously be recognized as a “matched lead”
potential supplier for security services opportunities in British Columbia, given BCCC’s track record in participating in similar Government of Canada security service opportunities. This, in turn, raises questions about optimizing competition for such opportunities. BCCC is very active in this area, regularly competing for a large number of security guard opportunities in British Columbia, with high dollar values.[10] In fact, the email exchanges on the record before the Tribunal indicate that, when BCCC wrote to the contracting authority on June 5, 2025, detailing its concerns, all that the contracting authority was able to respond was that it was “… not sure why [BCCC] was not auto-notified of the solicitation based on [its] notification parameters set up in CanadaBuys and the ARIBA system.”
[11] The Tribunal understands that BCCC would not have found that answer helpful in the least.
[17] In contrast to BCCC’s investigation into potential shortcomings on its part, the Tribunal notes that PWGSC seemingly did not inquire as to why the search and notification functions of CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba may have failed BCCC—or, if PWGSC did conduct such an inquiry, it did not share its findings with BCCC or the Tribunal.
[18] The Tribunal would expect that CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba should be capable of identifying the search terms entered by BCCC, determining whether BCCC was notified in accordance with its established search criteria, and, if it was not, explaining the reasons of the failure and what BCCC or PWGSC might need to do differently. In short, the Tribunal expects PWGSC to be able to inform BCCC whether CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba functioned as BCCC would reasonably have expected them to. The Tribunal expects PWGSC be able to use the owner-accessible functionalities of CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba to obtain this information, or, if such functionalities do not exist, to contemplate incorporating them into the system. PWGSC did not address these issues during these proceedings.
[19] Conversely, if PWGSC can confirm that CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba worked according to specifications, then PWGSC should be able to guide BCCC in adjusting its search and monitoring functions. PWGSC did not volunteer to do this.
[20] The Tribunal urges PWGSC to work with BCCC to examine the operation of CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba in relation to this case with a view to helping BCCC—and potential suppliers more broadly—better monitor future opportunities and address any deficiencies in the search and notification functions that may be identified.
[21] Despite presenting prima facie evidence of an unexplainably unfindable RFP—or of a glitch or fundamental problem—BCCC did not receive the answer to the valid questions it raised through this complaint: why it missed the RFP and whether CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba malfunctioned.
[22] Whether the CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba search and notification functions have performed optimally is therefore a question that remains unanswered. However, this issue falls outside the scope of the Tribunal’s inquiry. The valid questions raised in this complaint should nonetheless be important for PWGSC to address, as doing so would help ensure it reaches the greatest number of bidders possible to maximize competition, thereby providing better assurances of achieving value for money. In that sense, determining whether CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba functioned properly, and whether PWGSC and bidders like BCCC can rely on them is essential to ensuring the integrity of the competitive procurement system.
Directly notifying incumbent and known potential suppliers of pending opportunities fosters competition and value for money and is not inconsistent with the trade agreements
[23] In the GIR, in response to BCCC’s submission that it should have been notified of the RFP, PWGSC stated that it was under no obligation to inform incumbent bidders of a new solicitation.[12] PWGSC is correct: it was not required to do so under the CFTA. BCCC recognized as much but noted that it is considered “common”
or “best”
practice.[13] PWGSC’s answer, although correct, was a very strict and legalistic one, and that is why the Tribunal is compelled to closely examine PWGSC’s legal argument on the subject.
[24] In support of its legal position in the GIR, PWGSC relied on the Tribunal’s statement in Geophysical Service Incorporated v. Department of Public Works and Government Services (Geophysical) that it may not be proper for a government institution to notify incumbents or potential bidders of an opportunity on the grounds of potential unfairness.[14] PWGSC’s legal answer does not align with how things work in the real world. The fact remains that the RFP was in the public domain, and BCCC and other incumbents and known bidders often find out about a retender or new solicitation through direct communication from PWGSC or other government institutions—even if only as a best practice and not a trade agreement obligation.
[25] PWGSC’s position on this issue in the GIR is confusing and disconnected from the practical realities of doing business with the government, as the practice is either sound or it is not. Put otherwise, if the practice is potentially unfair, why is it followed at all? Conversely, if it is a good practice—or even a best practice—why is it not followed consistently? When it is not followed, bidders like BCCC can understandably wonder why they are informed of a retender or new solicitation in certain cases and not others, why the government institution treats them differently from time to time and why the practice varies across departments. These questions reflect nothing more than human nature and basic business acumen.
[26] In this case, BCCC was not informed that the new opportunity had been published. Consequently, PWGSC’s reliance in the GIR on paragraph 9 of Geophysical is confusing, as it raises at least the question of whether some PWGSC officials are unsure about the appropriateness of the practice, and whether they refrained from applying it in this instance because they were unsure if doing so was appropriate or permissible.[15]
[27] The Tribunal believes it important to stress that the statement from paragraph 9 of Geophysical referred to by PWGSC in the GIR is not a basis for PWGSC officials to refrain from directly alerting incumbent suppliers or suppliers that have tendered on past opportunities of the existence of pending ones.
[28] Advising an incumbent or potential supplier of an opportunity before it is publicly released can raise issues of fairness. That is not what this case is about. This case raises the issue of direct notification of a bidder after the publication of an opportunity. Once a retender or an opportunity is made public, the Tribunal fails to see how notifying anyone—including incumbents and known potential suppliers—could be unfair.[16] The Tribunal is not suggesting that government institutions are obligated to do so under the trade agreements, nor is it suggesting that potential suppliers are relieved of the responsibility of independently keeping themselves informed of published opportunities. In simple terms, it makes sound business sense for a government institution to make reasonable efforts to disseminate an open opportunity, consistent with the objective of maximizing competition and, ultimately, ensuring value for taxpayers in public procurement.[17] The Tribunal believes that paragraph 9 of Geophysical and other similar pronouncements must be read in the limited context of forbidding the provision of insider information prior to the public release of a tender.
[29] From a practical standpoint, had BCCC been directly notified by email that the new opportunity had been published, this complaint would not have arisen.[18] In concrete terms, failing to follow best practices led to an ironic situation: the file indicates that BCCC only learned of the RFP on May 30, 2025—after the bid closing deadline—when a representative from PWGSC’s Procurement Branch asked BCCC why it had not tendered a bid in response to the solicitation?[19]
[30] BCCC had two responses to that question, and several questions of its own for PWGSC. First, BCCC did not see and could not find the RFP posting on CanadaBuys or SAP Ariba despite having a team that monitors both daily, and asked whether there had been an issue on PWGSC’s end. Second, BCCC observed that it missed it in part because it had not been notified, and asked whether this was due to a lapse despite years of ongoing business together.
[31] The Tribunal finds that there is nothing wrong with directly notifying incumbents, as well as any known potential suppliers—including bidders on prior similar solicitations—that a new opportunity has been posted and that a bidding period is open. On the contrary, disseminating information and encouraging as much competition as possible, including from incumbents or former suppliers, are in fact cornerstones of good public procurement policy and stated objectives of the trade agreements.[20]
[32] The vitality of the competitive procurement system is fostered when government institutions publicize all tendering opportunities as widely as possible, including through the best practice of informing incumbent suppliers and past bid proponents that new opportunities are available. If a government institution knows that certain potential suppliers have shown interest in the same or similar opportunities in the past, it should reasonably assume that those suppliers may also be interested in new or current opportunities of a similar nature. In such cases, the institution should recognize that that fostering competition is in everyone’s interest and may therefore choose to email those potential suppliers directly instead of relying solely on CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba postings.
[33] Informing someone about an opportunity does not, on its face, amount to favouritism, since information is neutral and bears no direct connection to the later evaluation stage of a procurement process, which is conducted on merit.
[34] The Tribunal invites government institutions to consider whether incumbents and bidders on previous or similar opportunities should be systematically and directly notified in writing of retendering opportunities so that government institutions can ensure that at least known likely potential suppliers are made aware of new procurement opportunities. Government institutions should consider whether relying solely on CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba is sufficient or constitutes basic good business practice, whether these tools properly notify known potential suppliers and why their search function may fail, even for sophisticated bidders like BCCC, as may have been the case here.
[35] Full costs should not to be awarded to PWGSC because BCCC raised important and genuine issues in its complaint, which PWGSC chose not to address directly, even though it had the opportunity to do so. A narrow legal argument was sufficient to defend the complaint. Also, mixed messages were being sent by PWGSC regarding whether incumbents can be notified about a pending solicitation of obvious interest. This important issue—relevant to the possible betterment of the competitive procurement system and possibly unclear to PWGSC and other government institutions—surfaced only because BCCC sought accountability from PWGSC for the conduct of this procurement process.
There was no evidence of a predetermined outcome
[36] Finally, BCCC’s complaint contained statements to the effect that the outcome of the solicitation would somehow have been predecided by PWGSC officials but provided no evidence supporting that contention at the time of filing the complaint or during the inquiry. Complainants must provide evidence of any allegation at the outset.[21]
[37] The Tribunal has previously remarked that statements of this nature are easily made but difficult to refute except through general denial, as PWGSC has done. The problem is that doubts surrounding integrity may persist even when a complaint is rejected, as is the case here.[22]
[38] Such remarks can undermine public confidence in the integrity of the Public Service and are, at best, fundamentally counterproductive. The Tribunal strongly urges aggrieved bidders, particularly sophisticated ones like BCCC, to refrain from making them unless clear and compelling supporting evidence can be produced at the time they are made. Again, this was not the case here. BCCC is liable for costs associated with this issue.
COSTS
[39] Under the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Procurement Inquiry Regulations, the Tribunal must award costs to a government institution when it successfully defends a procurement complaint, as is the case here.[23] The Tribunal has discretion to fix the amount of such costs.
[40] Although the RFP was published in accordance with CFTA procedures, rendering the complaint technically invalid, the complaint nonetheless had merit in drawing attention to issues relevant to the integrity of the competitive procurement system. In particular, it brought to light possible technological flaws in CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba, as BCCC experienced unexplained unreliability in the search and notification functions. Given that CanadaBuys is the Government of Canada’s official electronic tendering service, this is an issue of high importance.
[41] PWGSC did not explain to BCCC or to the Tribunal why CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba did not work for BCCC or why BCCC was not able to become aware of the RFP in a timely manner, despite its honest best efforts and considerable attention. The complaint highlighted the need for PWGSC to investigate whether CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba are functioning properly, report any findings, address any deficiencies, and otherwise better assist bidders in navigating and using CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba as intended.
[42] The complaint also was not without merit because it brought to light the fact that PWGSC appears to have been confused as to whether it is legally permissible to directly notify incumbent suppliers and known “matched lead”
potential suppliers for pending opportunities. It can legally do so and is encouraged to contemplate doing so systematically as a best practice.
[43] The Tribunal also notes that the complaint required PWGSC to produce a very short GIR, a little less than half of which dealt with arguments. This was not an onerous undertaking, and it left unresolved issues of genuine importance to BCCC, and potentially to PWGSC and all bidders, regarding whether they can rely on CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba to function as they should.
[44] In summary, to fix the amount of costs, the Tribunal considered the exceptional circumstances of this matter. The complaint was technically not valid (on a narrow point of legality) and was both simple and easily addressed by PWGSC, which chose an economical litigation stance after deciding that no investigation was necessary—significantly reducing its burden in responding to the complaint. PWGSC did not assist BCCC in identifying what might have gone wrong or otherwise attempt to resolve this matter without the Tribunal’s intervention. Nevertheless, the complaint raised the important systemic issues examined above. Conversely, the issue relative to the purported predetermined outcome raised by BCCC required PWGSC to respond to a baseless ground of complaint.
[45] For the reasons given above, the Tribunal finds that exceptional circumstances are present and therefore fixes at $287.50 the amount of costs payable by BCCC to PWGSC. This amount represents one quarter of the Level I amount set out in the Tribunal’s Procurement Costs Guidelines.
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Eric Wildhaber |
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Eric Wildhaber |
[1] Exhibit PR-2025-013-07.A, p. 107.
[2] Ibid., p. 1–107.
[3] See Enviro Plus Duct Cleaning v. Department of Public Works and Government Services (20 June 2025), PR‑2025-010, paras. 22–26, where the Tribunal comments on the unavailability of solicitation documents on CanadaBuys and SAP Ariba. The Tribunal also notes that the solicitation documents were not accessible on SAP Ariba at the time of writing these reasons nor were they accessible to BCCC at the time of filing its complaint on July 3, 2025. Exhibit PR-2025-011-01.A, p. 1.
[4] PWGSC’s screenshot of SAP Ariba buyer’s view, Exhibit PR-2025-013-07.A, p. 107. Solicitation M2989-252261, CanadaBuys, online: https://canadabuys.canada.ca/en/tender-opportunities/tender-notice/ws4816329140-doc4929910132.
[5] PR-2025-013-01, p. 6–8, 13–14.
[6] GIR, Exhibit PR-2025-013-07.A, p. 12, para. 38. Paragraph 35 of the GIR with a footnote to the tender notice on CanadaBuys, online: https://canadabuys.canada.ca/en/tender-opportunities/tender-notice/ws4816329140-doc4929910132, Exhibit 2025-013-07.A, p. 12. See also Exhibit PR-2025-013-07.A, p. 107.
[7] See BCCC’s complaint form, which indicates the following: “By contrast, SAP Ariba does not allow users to configure custom filters or keywords. Instead, notifications are sent periodically based on what Ariba identifies as
‘matched’ leads, determined by the organization’s profile information and selected service categories at the time of registration.”
Exhibit PR-2025-011-01, p. 6–7.
[8] In other contexts, the Tribunal has emphasized that a procuring entity must exercise diligence with regard to the various procedural aspects of a procurement. For example, when selecting a platform to conduct its procurements, the procuring entity must use a platform that does not create undue risk of error. Keverest Technologies Inc. v. Department of Public Works and Government Services (29 January 2025), PR-2024-043, paras. 68–74.
[9] Chantier Davie Canada Inc. and Wärtsilä Canada Inc. v. Department of Public Works and Government Services (1 February 2023), PR-2022-053 (CITT) [Chantier Davie], paras. 34, 47, 54–55.
[10] See email correspondence between BCCC and PWGSC, where BCCC indicates that “Commissionaires BC placed over $15M worth of RFP bids in the last fiscal year … one of the reasons we can produce such a high volume of bids is that our internal processes ensure we do not miss them.”
Exhibit PR-2025-013-01.A, p. 6.
[11] See email exchanges of June 5, 2025, and June 16, 2025, Exhibit PR-2025-013-01.A, p. 4–6.
[12] GIR, Exhibit PR-2025-013-07.A, p. 13, para. 41.
[13] See BCCC’s June 17, 2025, email, Exhibit PR-2025-013-01.A, p. 3.
[14] (25 May 2009), PR-2009-008 (CITT), para. 9. GIR, Exhibit PR-2025-013-07.A, p. 13, para. 42, footnote 24.
[15] Exhibit PR-2025-013.01.A, p. 4. In PWGSC’s email to BCCC dated June 16, 2025, PWGSC states the following: “After reviewing our internal policies on notifications, I can confirm that there is no requirement for us to individually notify incumbent suppliers—or any suppliers—once a procurement opportunity has been posted. The act of publicly posting the Notice of Proposed Procurement (NPP) serves as the formal notification to industry that we have a requirement for a particular good or service.”
(see Exhibit PR-2025-013.07.A, para. 15).
[16] Advising incumbents and other known suppliers is already envisaged in the Supply Manual. See article 4.75.35 of the Supply Manual, which states the following:
4.75.35 Contacting suppliers directly during the solicitation period
Effective date: 2010-01-11
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On occasion, based on commodity/market knowledge, a contracting officer may conclude that suppliers of a good or service will not see or respond to a solicitation if it appears only on the GETS. In such cases, in order to stimulate effective competition and seek best value for Canadian taxpayers, the contracting officer may contact all such known suppliers to inform them that the solicitation opportunity has been posted.
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This contact must only take place after the Notice of Proposed Procurement has appeared on the GETS, and it should take place as quickly as possible so that the suppliers contacted do not lose time. To ensure that there will be no question of preferential treatment, this communication should be in writing so that it can be shown that all suppliers had access to the same information at the same time.
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The specific purpose of this contact is to ensure that the suppliers know that there is an opportunity available and to direct them to GETS. For that reason, the contact will be limited to giving brief information about the good or service being procured and to providing the appropriate reference (one or more of reference number, Source ID and solicitation number). It must not include any information that will not be available to suppliers who find out about the opportunity directly through GETS.
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Contracting officers must document on the file, the date and name of each supplier that was contacted. The recommended method of notification is the provision of a copy of the NPP.
[17] Canada (Attorney General) v. Almon Equipment Limited, 2010 FCA 193, para. 23.
[18] Again, information sharing of the sort is foreseen in the Supply Manual. See article 4.75.35 of the Supply manual, quoted in footnote 16.
[19] This is not the first complaint illustrating this type of situation. See Aqua Valley Water v. Department of Public Works and Government Services (6 August 2021), PR-2020-098 (CITT), para. 16. That complaint was found to be valid on its own particular facts. To avoid any confusion, the Tribunal here does not mean to imply that failure to notify the incumbent directly, or any other potential supplier, amounts to a breach of the trade agreements. What these cases illustrate is that, from a practical standpoint, simply publishing an opportunity without proactively informing potential suppliers is inefficient and counterproductive.
[20] See for example Article 500 of the CFTA, which states the following: “The purpose of this Chapter is to establish a transparent and efficient framework to ensure fair and open access to government procurement opportunities for all Canadian suppliers.”
and Article 502(1) of the CFTA, which states the following: “Each Party shall provide open, transparent, and non-discriminatory access to covered procurement by its procuring entities.”
[21] Chantier Davie, paras. 34, 47, 54–55.
[22] TPG Technology Consulting Ltd. (12 September 2007), PR-2007-033 (CITT), p. 2; Raytheon Canada Limited v. Department of Public Works and Government Services (19 January 2016), PR-2015-026 (CITT), para. 41.
[23] Paragraph 11.3(1)(b) of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Procurement Inquiry Regulations.